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Efficiencies are often used as a motivation for mergers.  There is a 
trade-off between the improvement of society’s welfare generated by 
mergers when the resulting firm achieves significant efficiencies, and the 
potential consumer harm generated by the increase in market power.1  The 
question then becomes not purely whether mergers are capable of 
producing efficiencies, but to which extent antitrust/competition policy 
will take them under consideration,2 either placing emphasis on consumer 
protection or total welfare.3 
Established in conjunction between the U.S. Department of Justice 
and the Federal Trade Commission (the Agencies), the 2010 Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines (2010 Guidelines) state that “[t]he Agencies seek to 
identify and challenge competitively harmful mergers while avoiding 
unnecessary interference with mergers that are either competitively 
beneficial or neutral.”4  Mergers in the United States are formally 
evaluated under the Rule of Reason—a legal doctrine that establishes that 
antitrust cases must be evaluated on the merits, based on evidence of each 
particular case, to establish whether the conduct at issue yields an 
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 1. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 
AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968) [hereinafter Williamson, The Welfare Tradeoffs]; Oliver E. Williamson, 
Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 705 (1977). 
 2. Ilene Knable Gotts & Calvin S. Goldman, The Role of Efficiencies in M&A Global Antitrust 
Review: Still in Flux?, in FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE: INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW 
& POLICY 201 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 2003). 
 3. See DANIEL J. GIFFORD & ROBERT T. KUDRLE, THE ATLANTIC DIVIDE IN ANTITRUST: AN 
EXAMINATION OF US AND EU COMPETITION POLICY 25 (2015) (exploring the “meanings that may 
attach to ‘welfare’ as the primary goal of competition policy and how economic welfare . . . relate[s] 
to . . . monopolization in the United States and dominance in Europe”).   
 4. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 1 
(2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/KM9N-2Z4U] [hereinafter 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES]. 
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unreasonable restraint of trade, and is thus illegal.5  Some other 
anticompetitive practices are considered per se illegal—such as price 
fixing—and thus do not require further in-depth analysis.6  Since the 
likelihood of anticompetitive harm from mergers can be influenced by 
whether the merger generates efficiencies, it seems natural that those 
efficiencies should be taken under consideration in a Rule of Reason 
analysis. 
The 2010 Guidelines acknowledged that “a primary benefit of mergers 
to the economy is their potential to generate significant efficiencies and 
thus enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, which 
may result in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced service, or new 
products.”7  Especially as it relates to estimates of price increase, the 2010 
Guidelines also noted that “[i]n a unilateral effects context, incremental 
cost reductions may reduce or reverse any increases in the merged firm’s 
incentive to elevate price” and thus, at least in principle, should be 
incorporated into any notion of post-merger price approximations relating 
to unilateral effects.8  Nevertheless, the 2010 Guidelines found that 
efficiency claims alone will not be enough to justify a merger, since 
“[e]ven when efficiencies generated through a merger enhance a firm’s 
ability to compete, however, a merger may have other effects that may 
lessen competition and make the merger anticompetitive.”9 
However, in their antitrust analysis trajectory, the Agencies have been 
nothing short of skeptical when incorporating efficiency claims of 
procompetitive effects in Rule of Reason analysis.10  In order to be taken 
into consideration into merger analysis, efficiency claims by the merging 
parties have to be merger-specific and verifiable, which have historically 
been interpreted to exclude most efficiency claims related to economies of 
scale, since scale can at least hypothetically be obtained other than through  
  
 
 5. Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 81, 83 (2018). 
 6. Id.  
 7. 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 10. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. For a comprehensive review of the historical evolution of antitrust policy regarding merger 
efficiency claims on both the United States and European Union, see GIFFORD & KUDRLE, supra note 
3, at 39; Konstanze Kinne, Efficiencies in Merger Analysis, INTERECONOMICS, Nov.–Dec. 1999, at 
297, 297–302 (1999) (explaining in a little more detail specificities on the German case); Daniel A. 
Crane, Rethinking Merger Efficiencies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 347 (2011) (going through the asymmetries 
and implicit bias of competition agencies both in the U.S. and European Union when it comes to the 
burden of proof and magnitude arising from potential mergers as opposed to figures regarding harm 
to competition).  
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mergers.11  The 2010 Guidelines stated: 
 The Agencies credit only those efficiencies likely to be accomplished 
with the proposed merger and unlikely to be accomplished in the absence 
of either the proposed merger or another means having comparable 
anticompetitive effects.  These are termed merger-specific 
efficiencies. . . . 
 Efficiency claims will not be considered if they are vague, 
speculative, or otherwise cannot be verified by reasonable means. . . .  
 Cognizable efficiencies are merger-specific efficiencies that have 
been verified and do not arise from anticompetitive reductions in output 
or service.  Cognizable efficiencies are assessed net of costs produced by 
the merger or incurred in achieving those efficiencies.12 
With the adoption of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements 
Act of 1976,13 merger analysis became prophylactic, and inferences of 
potential anticompetitive harm arising from a merger must be done ex 
ante.  It becomes clear how the difficulty in producing proof of efficiency 
claims is a major hindrance to its adoption in merger analysis.14 
This paper is organized as follows: Part I explores the relevance of 
which welfare standard is used in antitrust in how efficiencies will be taken 
under consideration in merger analyses.  Part II uses text mining to make 
a historical analysis of U.S. antitrust policy.  Part III explores the 
implications of using market concentration as a proxy for market power in 
the presence of efficiencies by designing a Monte Carlo study.  Part IV 
offers the results and analysis of the accuracy of the Herfindahl Hirschman 
Index as a merger screening tool in the presence of efficiencies. 
I. EFFICIENCIES AND THE CONSUMER WELFARE STANDARD 
Oliver Williamson has shown the trade-off between the improvement 
of society’s welfare generated by mergers when the resulting firm achieves 
significant efficiencies, as well as the potential consumer harm generated 
by the increase in market power.15  The baseline of Williamson’s model is 
a simple market, in which existent market structure is relatively 
competitive and two firms in this market have the opportunity to combine 
 
 11. Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Scale Economies and Synergies in Horizontal Merger 
Analysis, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 685, 689–90 (2001).  
 12. 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 10.  
 13. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2018). 
 14. Joseph Kattan, Efficiencies and Merger Analysis, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 513, 535 (1994). 
 15. See Williamson, The Welfare Tradeoffs, supra note 1, at 18–36. 
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and become more efficient.16  The dynamics then portray two 
simultaneous effects: (1) the gained efficiency diminishes cost, which is 
total welfare increasing, part of which will be passed through to 
consumers; and (2) the concentration is translated into gains in the ability 
to price above the competitive level (i.e., market power).17  The ultimate 
and net effect for society will depend on the magnitude of cost savings, as 
well as the deadweight loss caused by gains in market power.18  The net 
effect for consumers depend additionally on the pass-through of these cost 
savings onto consumers.19 
The consequences of the model can be analyzed in many different 
ways.  Mergers, in the presence of efficiencies, may be welfare20 
increasing.  The presence of efficiencies is not a sufficient condition for a 
net positive effect, but it signals that there is this possibility, and at the 
very least those should be taken under consideration.  It is also possible 
that a merger in the presence of efficiencies may be welfare increasing for 
society while harming consumers.  This is the main source of discussion 
of adopting a total welfare vs. a consumer welfare standard.  In other 
words, should antitrust be concerned solely with the potential harm to 
consumers, or should society’s welfare be the primary goal? 
Most economies follow the consumer defense approach as opposed to 
the total welfare approach.  From the major countries, Canada,21 
Australia,22 and New Zealand openly follow the total welfare description.23  
If emphasis is on consumer welfare, the question is not whether the merger 
generates enough efficiencies to offset deadweight loss, but whether the 
efficiencies are significant enough to offset firm’s incentive to raise 
 
 16. Id. at 21. 
 17. Id. at 21–24. 
 18. Id. at 22. 
 19. Id. 
 20. I purposefully did not specify whose welfare, because it could in fact increase both public 
and society’s or just one of them, but I will break this down in more detail later on. 
 21. Marc Duhamel, On the Social Welfare Objectives of Canada’s Antitrust Statute, 29 
CANADIAN PUB. POL’Y 301, 302 (2003).  
 22. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Reviews of Regulatory 
Reform: Competition Policy in Australia, at 13 (2010), http://www.oecd.org/regreform/regulatory 
-policy/44529918.pdf [https://perma.cc/79BB-DLGA] (“A recent statement . . . by the Australian 
Competition Tribunal favours [the total welfare approach] but with the caveat that benefits to 
producers should weigh less than benefits to end-consumers.”). 
 23. Kenneth Heyer, Consumer Welfare and the Legacy of Robert Bork, 57 J.L. & ECON. S19, S26 
n.5 (2014). 
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prices,24 a much harder threshold to reach.25 
Additional considerations regarding the objectives of welfare 
standards can be seen in José Azar et al., which stated that, “[w]hile 
consumers are the main focus of antitrust enforcement, the weakening of 
antitrust enforcement has likely also adversely impacted workers, thus 
contributing to increasing inequality.”26  Antitrust analyses are shaped by 
welfare standards and, more specifically, by questions involving whose 
welfare should be considered.27 
According to Kenneth Heyer, competition should not be the goal of 
antitrust, but rather the means to efficiency, which ought to be the primary 
goal.28  Part II describes the journey of efficiencies as an antitrust defense 
over time in the United States. 
II. EFFICIENCIES IN U.S. MERGER GUIDELINES AND HISTORIC 
BACKGROUND 
There are many historic analyses and perspectives of antitrust in 
existing literature.  This paper provides a quantitative approach to the 
evolution of antitrust analysis based on text mining techniques in antitrust 
cases in which the Agencies have taken public enforcement actions.29  Text 
 
 24. Howard Shelanski, Efficiency Claims and Antitrust Enforcement, in 1 OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS (Roger D. Blair & Daniel Sokol eds., 2014). 
 25. Gregory J. Werden, A Robust Test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers Among Sellers 
of Differentiated Products, 44 J. INDUS. ECON. 409, 412–13 (1996). 
 26. José Azar et al., Antitrust and Labor Market Power, ECON. FOR INCLUSIVE PROSPERITY, May 
2019, at 1, 1. 
 27. Kenneth Heyer, Welfare Standards and Merger Analysis: Why Not the Best?, 2 COMPETITION 
POL’Y INT’L 2–3 (2006); see also Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, 
Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1041–42 (1987) (arguing 
consumer welfare must be considered in conjunction with economic efficiency for the purpose of 
antitrust analysis). 
 28. William J. Kolaksy & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of 
Efficiencies Into Antitrust Review of Horizonal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207, 207 (2003); see also 
Lawrence Summers, Competition Policy in the New Economy, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 353, 358 (2001) 
(“[I]t needs to be remembered that the goal is efficiency, not competition.  The ultimate goal is that 
there be efficiency.”).  
 29. Data of which cases have had public merger enforcement actions brought by the Federal 
Trade Commission from fiscal year 2000 to the second quarter of fiscal year 2019.  FTC Merger 
Enforcement Actions, DATA CATALOG, https://catalog.data.gov/dataset/ftc-merger-enforcement-
actions [https://perma.cc/W2VP-DQMD] (last updated Apr. 5, 2019).  Data of which cases have been 
investigated by the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, filtered for “Horizontal Merger” 
violations.  Antitrust Case Filings, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (last visited Feb. 13, 2020), https://www 
.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-case-filings?f%5B0%5D=field_case_violation%3A7066 [https://perma.cc 
/45SC-M45 4].  For both these data, year 2019 was excluded from the analysis as it had not concluded 
at the time of writing this paper.  The data on merger enforcements from the Antitrust Division goes 
back much further, and therefore any analysis using text mining prior to year 2000 corresponds to the 
Department of Justice’s enforcement only. 
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mining allows for text that already exists—in this particular case, in the 
form of memorandum opinions—into data frames that can be manipulated, 
summarized, and visualized in such ways to provide us insights in the form 
of patterns.30  Mauro La Noce et al. applied a similar concept of text 
mining antitrust cases to detect patterns in Italian antitrust policy over 
time.31  To my knowledge, this is the first paper to apply text mining 
techniques to U.S. antitrust cases. 
I would like to start this historic background with a word cloud (Figure 
1) perspective on the cases that will be cited in this Part.  The words that 
are more frequently encountered in the union of those cases can be seen 
below, where words that appear more frequently have larger fonts. 
FIGURE 1: WORD CLOUD OF MOST COMMON WORDS IN SELECTED 
ANTITRUST CASES FROM 1962–2018 
The most common words are, in and of themselves, already very 
telling of the paths antitrust analyses have taken.  The relevant statutory 
provisions in merger analysis include Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which 
prohibits mergers if “in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting 
 
 30. See JULIA SILGE & DAVID ROBINSON, TEXT MINING WITH R: A TIDY APPROACH (2017), 
https://www.tidytextmining.com (discussing the text mining data mining method and relevant case 
studies). 
 31. Mauro La Noce et al., Merger Control in Italy 1995–2003: A Statistical Study of the 
Enforcement Practice by Mining the Text of Authority Resolutions, 13 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 307 (2006). 
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commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may 
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”32  
This has been historically interpreted as the need to establish product and 
geographic market definition.  It is no surprise that the most common word 
in all the cases is market, while product and geographic are not far behind.  
Other words are still somewhat related to these concepts of market 
definition, such as retail, industry, sales, local, and counties.  Another set 
of key words involve the basis on which these analyses and decisions are 
made regarding merger proposals, such as expert, evidence, testimony, 
data, assets, analysis, etc. 
In the United States, the Sherman Antitrust Act, and its expansion with 
the Clayton Act, are the main statutes governing mergers and acquisitions 
that substantially reduce market competition.33  In 1950, the Celler-
Kefauver Amendment reformed and strengthened the Clayton Act and 
marked an era of antitrust that was significantly more hostile towards 
mergers.34  This can be seen in Supreme Court decisions such as Brown 
Shoe Co. v. United States35 in 1962 and United States v. Von’s Grocery 
Co.36 in 1966, in which the Court assumed almost a per se rule of illegality 
on mergers in concentrated industries.  Additionally, in both cases, the 
Court noted a significant concern with the protection of small competitors 
in these industries as a means to protect competition, even if the merger 
would conceivably be beneficial to consumers.37  In Brown Shoe, the Court 
concluded: 
The retail outlets of integrated companies, by eliminating wholesalers 
and by increasing the volume of purchases from the manufacturing 
division of the enterprise, can market their own brands at prices below 
those of competing independent retailers.  Of course, some of the results 
of large integrated or chain operations are beneficial to consumers.  Their 
expansion is not rendered unlawful by the mere fact that small 
independent stores may be adversely affected.  It is competition, not 
competitors, which the Act protects.  But we cannot fail to recognize 
Congress’ desire to promote competition through the protection of 
viable, small, locally owned business.  Congress appreciated that 
 
 32. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
 33. See, e.g., Andreas Koutsoudakis, Antitrust More Than a Century After Sherman: Why 
Protecting Competitors Promotes Competition More Than Economically Efficient Mergers, 34 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 223, 231–39 (2009). 
 34. See, e.g., id. at 239–40; 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
 35. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
 36. 384 U.S. 270 (1966). 
 37. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 344 (deciding the Court should defer to the legislative intent 
behind the adoption of antitrust legislation); Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. at 282–83 (1966) (Stewart, 
J. dissent) (disagreeing that the per se rule adopted by the majority complies with the legislative 
purpose of the relevant acts and amendments).  
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occasional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of 
fragmented industries and markets.  It resolved these competing 
considerations in favor of decentralization.  We must give effect to that 
decision.38 
The decision set a precedent that, even if mergers generate sufficient 
efficiencies that may offset any price increase through gains in market 
power and pass cost savings onto consumers, these efficiencies may not 
be used as an antitrust defense.39 
In 1963, United States v. Philadelphia National Bank established a 
presumption that mergers involving at least thirty percent of the relevant 
market were presumptively unlawful,40 which in turn, has significantly 
shaped the way prima facie cases have rested on level and increasing 
market concentration.41  In 1967, FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co. held that 
“[p]ossible economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality,” which 
reflects the view of the Agencies at the time,42 as we will see expressed in 
the 1968 Merger Guidelines.43  Figure 2 does a term frequency analysis of 
these early cases, in which we can see that market share and concentration 
are often mentioned.  Procter & Gamble efficiencies, entry, and barriers 
are mentioned often, as the concern that gained economies would translate 
into diminished ability to compete by smaller firms.44 
Even though the decision to not accept merger efficiencies as an 
antitrust defense has never been repealed by the Supreme Court, this is 
mostly because, since these early decisions, the Court has not had an 
occasion to revisit the issue of whether efficiencies can be used as a 
procompetitive argument.45  Antitrust policy has changed its approach 
since then, as explained in the subsequent paragraphs. 
 
 38. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 344. 
 39. See generally Kenneth S. Carlston, Introduction: The Meaning and Impact of Brown Shoe 
Co. v. United States, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 153 (1963). 
 40. 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
 41. Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, Market Structure, and Burdens of 
Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996, 1996–99 (2018). 
 42. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967).  
 43. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES (1968), https://www.justice.gov 
/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11247.pdf [https://perma.cc/FR42-Y3E2] [hereinafter 1968 
MERGER GUIDELINES].   
 44. See generally Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568. 
 45. An argument can be made that the Court in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc. 
implicitly repealed Procter & Gamble, since in the case efficiencies permitted the firm to cut prices to 
consumers, and “[t]o hold that the antitrust laws protect competitors from the loss of profits due to 
such price competition would, in effect, render illegal any decision by a firm to cut prices in order to 
increase market share.  The antitrust laws require no such perverse result.”  479 U.S. 104, 116 (1986). 
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FIGURE 2: EARLY CASES AND WORD FREQUENCY46 
The first Merger Guidelines date from 1968 and comprised both 
horizontal and vertical mergers.47  Economies were not taken under 
consideration “[u]nless there [were] exceptional circumstances.”48  In a 
horizontal merger context, this reluctance in accepting economies as a 
defense is due to, among other reasons, the possibility of achieving the 
same economies through “internal expansion” absent a merger49 and the 
“difficulties in accurately establishing the existence and magnitude of 
economies claimed for a merger.”50  In a vertical merger context, some 
exception is given to industries that have experienced a “trend toward 
vertical integration” and “will result in significant economies of 
production or distribution unrelated to advertising or other promotional 
economies.”51  Although, reluctance absent this exception is similarly 
present due to the belief that most of these efficiencies could be achieved 
through some “internal expansion into the supplying or purchasing 
 
 46. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. 294; Phila. Nat’l. Bank, 374 U.S. 321; Procter & Gamble, 386 
U.S. 568.  
 47. See 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43. 
 48. Id. §§ I.10, II.16. 
 49. Id. § II.16. 
 50. Id. § I.10. 
 51. Id. § II.14.a. 
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market”; whenever they are not possible, due to significant barriers to 
entry, the Department of Justice would likely not interfere with the 
merger.52  In the context of conglomerate mergers, a similar “internal 
expansion” justification is given.53 
A significant change in merger enforcement occurred with the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (HSR Act),54 which 
requires the parties to potential merger deals above a certain value to notify 
the Agencies prior to the deal consummation, allowing merger review to 
be much more prophylactic––it is more efficient to prevent a merger that 
may generate anticompetitive effects than to attempt to remedy or 
minimize the resulting harm of a merger that has already occurred. 
The 1980s was a period of deep change for antitrust policy, especially 
regarding the tradeoff between economic efficiency and limiting large 
corporations in the attempt to preserve consumer welfare.55  Such changes 
provoked a latent need for better quantitative methods and clear concepts 
to more clearly and coherently conduce antitrust policy. 
The second Merger Guidelines, which date from 1982, provided a 
significant paradigm shift by stating that “[i]n the overwhelming majority 
of cases, the Guidelines will allow firms to achieve available efficiencies 
through mergers without interference from the Department.”56  This 
apparent gain of trust comes with a warning, that “[p]lausible efficiencies 
are far easier to allege than to prove,”57 requiring “convincing evidence 
that the merger will produce substantial cost savings” from various sources 
“and that equivalent results could not be achieved within a comparable 
period of time through internal expansion or through a merger that 
threatened less competitive harm.”58 
The 1982 Merger Guidelines were relatively short-lived; the 
Department of Justice soon revised and approved the 1984 Merger 
Guidelines.59  The principles from the 1982 Guidelines are mostly present 
in the 1984 Merger Guidelines, although some of the ambiguous language 
 
 52. Id. § II.16. 
 53. Id. § III.18. 
 54. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2018). 
 55. Eleanor M. Fox, Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 
1140 (1981). 
 56. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES § V.1.A. (1982), https:// 
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11248.pdf [https://perma.cc/RP35-K8FS] 
[hereinafter 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES]. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. at n.53. 
 59. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES § 3.5 (1984), https://www.justice.gov 
/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11249.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4XY-RNV4]. 
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was made clearer.  We encounter the statement that “[t]he primary benefit 
of mergers to the economy is their efficiency-enhancing potential, which 
can increase the competitiveness of firms and result in lower prices to 
consumers,” which conveys a very positive attitude towards efficiency 
claims.60  The 1984 Merger Guidelines also elaborated on an extensive list 
of sources for “cognizable efficiencies,” while averting that it “will reject 
claims of efficiencies if equivalent or comparable savings can reasonably 
be achieved by the parties through other means.”61 
In 1991, the Eleventh Circuit took a significant step in FTC v. 
University Health, Inc., in which it acknowledged that significant merger-
generated efficiencies, if substantiated, could result in a rebuttal of a prima 
facie case of illegality.62 
FIGURE 3: 1991–2000 CASES AND WORD FREQUENCY63 
In 1992, the Agencies established the first Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, which kept the same verbiage as the 1984 Merger 
 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id.  
 62. 938 F.2d 1206, 1221 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 63. FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996); United States v. 
Country Lake Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 669 (D. Minn. 1990); FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 
(D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa 1995); FTC v. 
Staples, 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1997); FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 
1991).  
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Guidelines.64  Its review in 1997 substantially elaborated and extended the 
section on efficiencies, by explicitly showing how efficiencies relate to 
topics from other sessions—such as coordinated and unilateral effects, 
market concentration as shown by the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI), 
and potential entry.65  It also coined the term merger-specific efficiencies, 
which replaced the long description in previous documents; and it took a 
stand by stating that they “found that certain types of efficiencies are more 
likely to be cognizable and substantial than others,” citing favorably 
“shifting production among facilities formerly owned separately, which 
enable the merging firms to reduce the marginal cost of production.”66  
Figure 3 shows a significant increase in the frequency of efficiencies in 
these cases. 
In the 2010 Guidelines, the optimist approach in the past decades was 
replaced with perhaps a little more caution, as indicated in the statement 
that “[c]ompetition usually spurs firms to achieve efficiencies internally.  
Nevertheless, a primary benefit of mergers to the economy is their 
potential to generate significant efficiencies and thus enhance the merged 
firm’s ability and incentive to compete.”67  The 2010 Guidelines placed 
significant emphasis on the expectations for cognizable efficiencies, while 
recognizing they will “consider whether cognizable efficiencies likely 
would be sufficient to reverse the merger’s potential to harm customers in 
the relevant market.”68  The focus shifted from efficiencies that reduce 
marginal cost to acknowledge that efficiencies can “operate along multiple 
dimensions,” and even mentions potential efficiencies in innovation that 
may not be reflected in “short-term pricing.”69  However, they equally 
recognized that some types of efficiencies are more likely to be 
cognizable, with the same example given in 1997 Guidelines.70  Figure 4 
shows method keywords that have played a significant role in recent cases.  
Figure 5 shows the most common bigram directional associations in 
antitrust cases, which efficiencies are most commonly associated with 
significant and defense. 
 
 64. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4 
(1992). 
 65. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4 
(1992, rev. 1997), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/hmg.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y53W-LYQR]. 
 66. Id. § 4 n.35.  
 67. See 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 10. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. 
2020] PARADIGM SHIFTS ON MERGER EFFICIENCIES 1029 




 71. United States v. Aetna, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2017); United States v. H&R Block, 
Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011); United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. 
Cal. 2004); FTC v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2015).  
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FIGURE 5: TERM FREQUENCY OF “EFFICIENCIES” IN SELECTED 
ANTIRUST CASES OVER TIME 
 
FIGURE 6: MOST COMMON BIGRAM DIRECTIONAL ASSOCIATIONS IN 
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An interesting measure that shows the variation of efficiency claims 
over time with term frequency, and term frequency times inverse 
document frequency, can be seen in Figures 6 and 7, respectively.  Term 
frequency is self-explanatory, while inverse document frequency is a 
measure of a term’s importance within a document.72  We can see an 
increase in efficiency claims following the incorporation of more 
descriptive efficiency requirements in the 1984 Merger Guidelines, and 
similarly with the actualization of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in 
1997.  There is also a significant increase of the term in recent years.  
Notice that increases in the term do not necessarily mean acceptance of 
those defenses, but rather the mentioning of those in court.  Another caveat 
of this measure is that if there is a decrease in the number of merger cases 
in general, this will also be translated as a smaller term frequency, and 
variations may not account for just variations of merger analysis or defense 
strategies. 
FIGURE 7: TERM FREQUENCY TIMES INVERSE DOCUMENT FREQUENCY 
OF “EFFICIENCIES” IN SELECTED ANTIRUST CASES OVER TIME 
 Despite this saga of varying understanding and acceptance of merger 
efficiencies in antitrust framework, a latent question is “whether 
efficiencies to date are still recognized more in theory than in practice.”73  
The ability to estimate ex ante merger specific efficiencies still poses a 
 
 72. Calculation of inverse document frequency is done by the logarithm of the ratio between the 
number of cases and the number of cases containing the term in question.  The more often a term 
appears in a case among the pool of cases, the more important this term ought to be in this particular 
case.  The product then is a good measure of the overall relevance of a term in a pool of cases (in this 
case, in each year).  See, e.g., SILGE & ROBINSON, supra note 30, ch. 3; NATURAL LANGUAGE 
PROCESSING AND TEXT MINING 5–6 (Anne Kao & Stephen R. Poteet eds., 2007). 
 73. Shelanski, supra note 24, at 464.  
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major hurdle in its admission as an antitrust defense. 
FIGURE 8: HSR ACT PRE-MERGER NOTIFICATIONS AND HSR ACT 
INVESTIGATIONS INITIATED (2007–2016) 
 Figure 8 shows, over a decade, the volume of HSR Act pre-merger 
notifications and the volume of investigations initiated in the United 
States.74  It becomes clear that the volume of actual investigations resulting 
from notifications is fairly low.75  One could ask whether merger-induced 
cost reductions should be taken under consideration as a potential defense, 
and if so, in which stage.  Part III discusses the use of market concentration 
screening techniques, such as the HHI, in merger analysis, which 
inherently do not account for merger efficiencies. 
III. MERGER EFFICIENCIES AND MARKET CONCENTRATION 
A common practice in merger screening is to look at market 
concentration measures, with the premise that more concentrated markets 
will likely be more anticompetitive, tending to harm consumers.  This can 
be seen in the statement, “Other things being equal, concentration affects 
 
 74. Data regarding annual HSR Act pre-merger notifications and investigations is publicly 
available and can be found on the Federal Trade Commission’s website under the Data Set Name 
“HSR Transactions Filings and Second Requests by Fiscal Year.”  Data Sets, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
https://www.ftc.gov/site-information/open-government/data-sets [https://perma.cc/E3JZ-69Q5] (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2020). 
 75. See id.  
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the likelihood that one firm, or a small group of firms, could successfully 
exercise market power.”76  This sentiment of skepticism towards market 
share and market concentration has somewhat evolved over time, as shown 
in Part II, and reflects the holistic nature of our contemporary merger 
review: “Market concentration is often one useful indicator of likely 
competitive effects of a merger. . . .  Market shares may not fully reflect 
the competitive significance of firms in the market or the impact of a 
merger.  They are used in conjunction with other evidence of competitive 
effects.”77  Despite its popularity in merger screening and analysis, it is 
important to verify whether market concentration measures in general, and 
the HHI in particular, are good tools to determine likelihood of harm 
arising from mergers in the presence of efficiencies.  Going back to 
Williamson, described in detail in Part I, the welfare impact of a simple 
case of mergers in the presence of efficiencies is ambiguous, due to two 
effects happening simultaneously: (1) increased concentration that is then 
translated into additional market power; and (2) cost-savings, which are 
partially passed through to consumers.78  By relying heavily on market 
concentration measures, one can observe the first driver of welfare 
changes, but not the second.79 
Doing a brief recap of measures of market concentration in 
consolidation analyses, we can see that in the 1968 Merger Guidelines 
until the beginning of the 1980’s (prior to the 1982 Merger Guidelines) 
these analyses were conducted by observing a four firm concentration 
ratio.80  This test, called the “top 4” or “CR4,” was the most widely-used 
method to infer market concentration.81  Despite its intuitive nature and 
clear message, this test has two major caveats.82  The CR4 does not take 
into account the size of each firm nor the number of firms in the market.83  
From both microeconomic theory and empirical studies, it is 
acknowledged that firms of different sizes have distinct competitive 
 
 76. 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 56, § III.A. 
 77. 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES supra note 4, § 5.3. 
 78. See Williamson, The Welfare Tradeoffs, supra note 1 at 18–36. 
 79. Id. at 33–34.  
 80. See 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43. 
 81. See David S. Weinstock, Using the Herfindahl Index to Measure Concentration, 27 
ANTITRUST BULL. 285, 285 (1982).  Concentration Ration for the Top 4 firms (CR4) is a simple sum 
of the market share of the four largest firms within an industry.  See id.  This test shows the percentage 
of the transactions of an industry retained by the largest four firms.  Id.  There is nothing special about 
the number four apart from the fact it was commonly used.  More generally there is the CRX, or 
Concentration Ration for the Top X firms.  See id. at 285 n.1. 
 82. See id. at 285. 
 83. Id. 
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dynamics.84  It is then necessary to provide policymakers and market 
analysts with a reliable quantitative method that better portrays the 
competitive incentives within a market.  When determining market 
concentration, it is insufficient to show just the percent of a market served 
by a certain number of firms because, ultimately, the information 
necessary is the incentives of competitive behavior or the lack thereof 
within a particular industry. 
The 1980s was a period of deep change for antitrust policy, especially 
when dealing with the tradeoff between limiting large corporations in the 
attempt to preserve consumer welfare and economic efficiency.85  Such 
changes provoked a latent need for better quantitative methods and clear 
concepts to more coherently conduce antitrust policy.86  William Baxter 
reinforces the idea that nonefficiency type goals tend to be intractable, 
which makes it hard to assess their success, and economic efficiency 
would therefore be the only workable standard from which the guidelines 
could be derived and any attainability of goals assessed.87 
The proposal and adoption of the HHI in the beginning of the 1980s 
inspired many to evaluate the impacts of such analytical instruments in 
conducting antitrust policy.88  Stephen Calkins evaluated the use of the 
HHI as the new merger guideline, and highlighted some of the features it 
brings that are advantageous when compared with the CR4, such as its 
responsiveness to asymmetry in market shares.89  The HHI is also much 
more comprehensive than the CR4, since its computation includes the 
market share of every firm within the market.90  The HHI then provided a 
considerably simpler tool to measure the impact of a horizontal merger 
based on the resulting increase in HHI. 
 
 84. See generally Miguel C. Manjón-Antolín, Firm Size and Short-Term Dynamics in Aggregate 
Entry and Exit, 28 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 464 (2010); Kim Dong-Hyeon et al., Firm Structure, Firm 
Size and Industry Growth, 41 INT’L REV. ECON. & FIN. 23 (2016); Abongeh Tunyi, Firm Size, Market 
Conditions and Takeover Likelihood, 18 REV. ACCT. & FIN. 483 (2019).  
 85. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1140, 1141–46 (1981) (discussing the emergence and evolution of antitrust law from the 1960s 
to the early 1980s). 
 86. See Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Peter O. Steiner, Quantitative Methods in Antitrust Litigation, 46 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69 (1983). 
 87. See William F. Baxter, Responding to the Reaction: The Draftsman’s View, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 
618 (1983).  
 88. For a complete review of the development and naming of the Herfindahl Index, see 
Weinstock, supra note 81. 
 89. Stephen Calkins, The New Merger Guidelines and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 71 
CALIF. L. REV. 402, 404 (1983).  The same advantage, however, brings another complication, since 
small errors in measurement of an industry’s market share will be amplified by the index and may 
yield wrongful judgements regarding mergers.  Id. 
 90. Id. at 411. 
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The HHI was adopted in 1982 as the standard form of calculating 
market concentration for merger analysis purposes.91  This methodology 
is still used today, as it is shown in the 2010 Guidelines, where 𝑠! is the 







A naïve change in HHI due to a merger is done with the simplifying 
assumption that the resulting firm from the merger would maintain the sum 
of the market share of the two previously independent merging parties, 
while having no redistribution of market share among the other firms in 
the market.  This results in a simple formula of change in HHI due to 
merger (Δ𝐻𝐻𝐼) as well as on how to estimate post-merger HHI ex ante as 
𝐻𝐻𝐼&'() = 𝐻𝐻𝐼&*+ + Δ𝐻𝐻𝐼.93  Let the market shares for merging parties 
A and B be respectively 𝑠, and 𝑠-. 
Δ𝐻𝐻𝐼 = (𝑠, + 𝑠-)" − 𝑠," − 𝑠-" = 2𝑠,𝑠- 
Nathan Miller et al. tested the accuracy of the HHI as a merger 
screening tool in a variety of merger scenarios through Monte Carlo 
experiments, and they make a compelling argument that HHI can in many 
cases be a good indicator.94  With existing barriers to entry, market power 
is the ability of firms to price above the competitive level and restrict 
output.  The more firms there are in the market, and/or the higher the 
degree of substitutability between products, the harder it is for firms to 
unilaterally restrict output.95 
Jéssica Dutra and Tarun Sabarwal document the need to include 
model-based efficiencies in the estimate of unilateral effects, such as 
upward pricing pressure and first order approximation.96  By construction, 
a naïve post-merger HHI will not account for any potential efficiencies 
that may arise from a transaction. 
In this paper, I test the accuracy of HHI as a merger screening tool in 
the presence of marginal cost reducing merger-specific cost 
complementarities.  To do so, I use a Monte Carlo study in which 
industries are randomly generated to span a wide range of economic 
 
 91. Id. at 402. 
 92. See 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 4.   
 93. Id. § 5.3 n.9 (providing examples of this calculation and further explanation). 
 94. Nathan H. Miller et al., Upward Pricing Pressure as a Predictor of Merger Price Effects, 52 
INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 216, 223–24 (2016).   
 95. We can see this relationship in Logit demand systems; for example, in which diversion ratios 
are proportional to market shares.  
 96. Jéssica Dutra & Tarun Sabarwal, Antitrust Analysis with Upward Pricing Pressure and Cost 
Efficiencies, PLOS ONE, Jan. 2020, at 1. 
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environments in which a merger might occur.  Following Miller et al., I 
classify mergers generated across five potential categories, as laid down 
by the 2010 Guidelines: 97 
• Category (i): HHI post-merger is greater than 2500 and HHI 
change from pre-merger to post-merger is greater than 200. 
• Category (ii): HHI post-merger is greater than 2500, however the 
change in concentration due to the transaction is greater than 100, 
but less or equal to 200. 
• Category (iii): HHI post-merger is greater than 1500 and change 
in HHI is above 100. 
• Category (iv): Resulting post-merger market is unconcentrated 
(i.e., HHI < = 1500). 
• Category (v): Change in concentration due to merger is of less 
than 100. 
The above categories are not mutually exclusive, but they provide 
decreasing likelihood of being investigated by the Agencies.  Therefore, 
in the remainder of this paper, I will use the allocation of potential merger 
cases into these categories as criteria for whether the Agencies would 
investigate such a merger, and thus infer the quality of HHI as a merger 
screening tool in the presence of merger efficiencies. 
To investigate the validity and efficacy of HHI as a merger screening 
tool in the presence of merger efficiencies in multiple market structures, I 
suppose a market structure for each industry, which may contain four, six, 
or eight firms competing in prices with differentiated goods.  Each firm 
produces a single output and industry equilibrium is Bertrand-Nash.98  The 
steps for data generating process and equilibria computation are as 
follows: 
1. Start with a market for four firms.   
2. Market shares are randomly drawn for each of the firms and an 
outside good.  The actual market shares that are used in the process 
are normalized to aggregate to one for the market in question.  The 
margin for the first firm is randomly drawn with support [0.2,0.8]. 
3. The parameters for the interactive term in the cost structures are 
randomly drawn with support [0,1]. 
4. Given the market shares and margins, it is possible to calibrate a 
Logit demand system, and thus, demand elasticities in the pre-
 
 97. See Miller et al., supra note 94; see also 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 
4, § 5. 
 98. See Dutra & Sabarwal, supra note 96 (providing equivalent method calibration details of the 
Monte Carlo simulations). 
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merger equilibrium.  Notice that the demand system is such that 
its parameters are chosen to rationalize the data drawn in the 
previous steps.  In this study, consumer substitution behavior is 
proportional to market shares.  These parameters are identified 
exactly given market shares, prices, and a single margin. 
5. Once the Logit demand system is obtained, it is possible to 
calibrate the remaining demand functional forms (Log-Linear, 
Linear and Almost Ideal) such that they are compatible with the 
Logit demand elasticities.  Similarly, the demand systems’ 
parameters are perfectly identified given market shares, prices, 
and Logit demand elasticities. 
6. In each draw, two firms go through a merger.  Post-merger 
equilibrium prices are computed as well as Herfindahl Hirschman 
Index.  Mergers are classified into five categories, as laid out in 
the 2010 Guidelines.99 
7. Repeat these steps until 3,000 draws of data are obtained. 
8. Repeat this process for six and eight firms’ market structures. 
This Monte Carlo study generates 72,000 mergers to be evaluated (3 
market structures, 4 demand systems, 2 cost structures, 3,000 draws of data 
each).  The market structure investigated involves a merger from four to 
three players, while the subsequent sets involve mergers from six to five, 
and from eight to seven players respectively.  The descriptive statistics for 
these can be found in Tables 2, 3, and 4.  Part IV discusses the results from 
the study described in this Part. 
IV. RESULTS 
The results from the Monte Carlo data generating process described in 
the Part III are described here.  As to be expected, the margin is relatively 
similarly distributed in all market structures, as it follows the same data 
generating process.  Thus, the differences across market structures are 
generated by the distinct market structures themselves, rather than initial 
diverging margin conditions.  The median four-firm market structure is 
moderately concentrated pre-merger and highly concentrated post-merger; 
the median six-firm market structure is moderately concentrated both pre-
merger and post-merger; and the median eight-firm market structure is 
unconcentrated pre-merger and just over the moderately concentrated 
threshold post-merger.  Thus, it is clear that the chosen structures span a 
significant portion of the critical potential merger environments that 
 
 99. See 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 5. 
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should be explored. 
Figure 9 shows the distribution kernels of pre- and post-merger 
concentrations of the markets generated in the Monte Carlo study.  The 
first row corresponds to the data generating process with a four-firm 
market structure, while the subsequent rows are for six and eight firms 
respectively.  As to be expected, randomly drawing industries with four 
firms generate much more concentrated markets than their counterparts 
with a greater number of firms.  As HHI is used as a market concentration 
measure—as well as one of the determinants in the likelihood of 
investigation by the Agencies—the pool of industries that was randomly 
generated in this Monte Carlo study make a compelling sample to study 
this relationship. 
FIGURE 9: PRE- AND POST-MERGER HHI DISTRIBUTION 
Cost reductions, given by a Generalized Leontief functional form, 
provide merger efficiencies that are a function of the ratio of production 
levels for the formerly independent firms, while Quadratic functional form 
provides that is proportional to the other firm’s production.  The former 
will provide higher magnitude cost reductions than the latter, given the 
same efficiency parameter.  Across all market structures, the efficiencies 
generated through Generalized Leontief can, at the median, more than 
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Quadratic generated efficiencies still allow for price increase.  Also notice 
that for comparable efficiencies, market structures with more firms will 
tend to have smaller price increases (competition motivated by number of 
firms in the market still reduces the likelihood that firms can increase 
prices profitably).  This price correlation seems to suggest that market 
concentration can be a useful indicator of whether competition agencies 
should be concerned with a proposed merger. 
Tracking the categories based on HHI as previously described, the 
probability that a merger that finds itself in one of these categories may 
increase price by at least 5% or 10% can be found on Tables 4, 5, and 6.  
For four firms in a Generalized Leontief cost structure, the probability of 
a 5% price increase if a proposed merger falls under category (i) ranges 
from 30% to 58% depending on the demand system, while for Quadratic 
it ranges from 61% to 90%.  Finding itself in categories (i) through (iii) 
ranges from 20% to 54.7%, and from 40% to 82%, respectively.  The 
ranges hold somewhat constant varying market structures.  For a 10% 
price increase, the probabilities are slightly more underwhelming.  
Potential mergers with a Generalized Leontief cost complementarity, that 
falls under category (i) has probabilities ranging from 16.6% to 54.3%, 
while the ones that fall under categories (i) through (iii) have probabilities 
ranging from 11.5% to 51.2% depending on demand curvature.  As to be 
expected, Quadratic cost complementarities have higher likelihood of 
price increase, due to smaller merger specific efficiencies.  This reinforces 
that idea that market concentration as measured by HHI can indicate 
effects at least in terms of likelihood of price increases, but the more 
substantial and significant the merger efficiencies are, the poorer of an 
indicator it will be.  Notice here that we are observing this relationship 
between concentration and prices from a unique angle: how often mergers 
that fall under certain HHI categories will translate themselves into actual 
price increases of at least a certain threshold. 
However, one of the fundamental roles of the HHI is to provide a 
merger screening tool.  In the best-case scenario, a merger flagged by the 
tool as generating potential anticompetitive effects is one that would 
indeed harm competition if allowed to go through.  But as with any tool, 
being an imperfect measure of reality, this is not always the case.  This 
creates two types of statistical errors.  A type I error, also known as a false 
positive, in this case occurs when the HHI indicates potential for 
anticompetitive effects in the transaction when, in reality, it would not.  A 
type II error, on the other hand, is one that the HHI would indicate no 
anticompetitive effects when, in fact, there would be. 
Based on each randomly generated market in the Monte Carlo study, 
1040 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
it is possible to observe how much a price has changed after the merger.  
In the 2010 Guidelines, there is not a predetermined threshold for a price 
increase that is deemed anticompetitive.  In order to calculate types I and 
II errors, it is necessary to infer the implicit anticompetitive threshold from 
the policymakers.  In this paper, two thresholds were considered: (1) a 5% 
increase, as it is taken as a threshold for market definition as a small but 
significant and non-transitory increase in price on the hypothetical 
monopolist test, as described in section 4.1.3 of the 2010 Guidelines; and 
(2) a 10% price increase has been considered by Joseph Farrell and Carl 
Shapiro,100 and Miller et al.101 
For criteria of whether a merger will be investigated based on levels 
of HHI, I investigate two different options based on the categories 
described in Part III, as follows: (1) the proposed merger can be classified 
in category (i); or (2) the proposed merger can be classified in at least one 
of categories (i), (ii), or (iii). 
This created the possibility of calculating for each market structure, 
demand system, and cost efficiencies functional form, four values of type 
I and type II errors.  Total error is the simple sum of type I and II statistical 
errors. 
As an example, before we get into the classification of a merger using 
a merger screening tool and the importance of thresholds in this 
computation, suppose a merger that has generated a 7.5% price increase, 
its resulting post-merger HHI is of 2750 and Δ𝐻𝐻𝐼 = 125. 
• Under the first combination of criteria, a merger is anticompetitive 
if it increases price by more than 5% and a merger belongs to 
category (i).  The merger in question presents a price increase 
greater than 5% but it does not belong to category (i).  Therefore, 
it constitutes a false negative. 
• Under the second combination of criteria, a merger is 
anticompetitive if it increases price by more than 10% and a 
merger belongs to category (i).  The merger in question is then a 
true negative. 
• Under the third combination of criteria, a merger is 
anticompetitive if it increases price by more than 5% and a merger 
belongs to at least one of categories (i), (ii), or (iii).  The merger 
in question is a true positive. 
• Under the fourth combination of criteria, a merger is 
 
 100. See Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic 
Alternative to Market Definition, B.E. J. THEORETICAL ECON., Jan. 2010, at 1, 12. 
 101. See Miller et al., supra note 94.   
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anticompetitive if it increases price by more than 10% and a 
merger belongs at least one of categories (i), (ii), or (iii).  The 
merger in question is a false positive. 
 It becomes clear that especially for the border cases, it is important to 
fine-tune both the understanding of which price increase is considered to 
be anticompetitive, as well as which naïve increases in market 
concentration will be used as a threshold.  Ideally, those will reflect the 
implicit thresholds from the Agencies.  Fortunately, for extreme cases, 
these fine tunings will not matter as much, and we can get a bigger picture 
of these likelihoods.  The various probabilities are reported on Tables 4, 5, 
and 6 reflect the shifts in mass from these fringe classifications based on 
various criteria. 
Total errors for first combination of criteria in four firms market 
structures range from 40–48% for Generalized Leontief cost 
complementarities, while being 24–33% for Quadratic.  For our fourth 
combination of criteria, we have total errors in the magnitude of 50–79% 
for Generalized Leontief and 31–77% for Quadratic.  It is clear that in the 
presence of efficiencies, relying on market concentration measures can be 
very uninformative about the likelihood of harming consumers as 
measured by price increases.  Even for efficiencies that are not as 
substantial as the ones from Quadratic cost complementarities, it is clear 
how many aggregate total errors can be accrued.  Similar patterns can be 
observed in all market structures. 
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS - FOUR FIRMS 
  
Four Firms 
      
  Median 10% 25% 75% 90% 
Market Conditions      
Market Share 0.201 0.049 0.114 0.276 0.339 
Margin 0.472 0.247 0.333 0.624 0.745 
      
Market Concentration      
Pre-Merger 1976 1415 1651 2430 2873 
Post-Merger 2706 1801 2164 3360 4041 
ΔHHI 648 113 310 1075 1520 
      
Merger Price Effects - Generalized Leontief Cost 
Structure    
Logit  -0.020 -0.319 -0.122 0.038 0.123 
Linear -0.038 -0.224 -0.112 0.022 0.101 
Log-Linear -0.081 -0.651 -0.363 0.183 1.072 
Almost Ideal -0.053 -0.462 -0.235 0.115 0.547 
      
Merger Price Effects - Quadratic Cost 
Structure     
Logit  0.043 0.006 0.019 0.073 0.109 
Linear 0.035 0.005 0.015 0.066 0.107 
Log-Linear 0.136 0.010 0.046 0.342 0.931 
Almost Ideal 0.083 0.007 0.030 0.201 0.497 
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TABLE 2:  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS - SIX FIRMS 
  
Six Firms 
      
  Median 10% 25% 75% 90% 
Market Conditions      
Market Share 0.143 0.033 0.078 0.201 0.247 
Margin 0.487 0.254 0.341 0.636 0.745 
      
Market Concentration      
Pre-Merger 1569 1233 1361 1818 2076 
Post-Merger 1925 1452 1649 2278 2666 
ΔHHI 316 46 137 556 843 
      
Merger Price Effects - Generalized Leontief Cost 
Structure    
Logit  -0.071 -0.414 -0.193 -0.002 0.054 
Linear -0.071 -0.265 -0.151 -0.012 0.033 
Log-Linear -0.166 -0.690 -0.430 0.023 0.390 
Almost Ideal -0.113 -0.508 -0.297 0.013 0.223 
      
Merger Price Effects - Quadratic Cost 
Structure     
Logit  0.021 0.001895 0.008 0.038 0.055 
Linear 0.015 0.001 0.005 0.029 0.044 
Log-Linear 0.062 0.004 0.022 0.143 0.316 
Almost Ideal 0.039 0.002 0.014 0.088 0.184 
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  Median 10% 25% 75% 90% 
Market Conditions      
Market Share 0.111 0.025 0.059 0.159 0.193 
Margin 0.495 0.257 0.346 0.644 0.746 
      
Market Concentration      
Pre-Merger 1280 1050 1147 1451 1620 
Post-Merger 1506 1196 1322 1722 1960 
ΔHHI 186 26 78 350 508 
      
Merger Price Effects - Generalized Leontief Cost 
Structure    
Logit  -0.102 -0.470 -0.237 -0.020 0.024 
Linear -0.088 -0.286 -0.167 -0.025 0.010 
Log-Linear -0.215 -0.715 -0.472 -0.022 0.127 
Almost Ideal -0.146 -0.541 -0.332 -0.016 0.080 
      
Merger Price Effects - Quadratic Cost 
Structure     
Logit  0.012 0.000 0.004 0.024 0.035 
Linear 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.017 0.025 
Log-Linear 0.034 0.001 0.010 0.071 0.136 
Almost Ideal 0.022 0.000 0.006 0.045 0.087 
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Generalized Leontief Cost Structure 
Threshold 1: Frequency of 5% Price Increase   
 Logit Linear Log-Linear Almost Ideal 
Category (i) 0.308 0.299 0.580 0.536 
Category (i), (ii) or (iii) 0.233 0.207 0.547 0.510 
     
Threshold 2: Frequency of 10% Price Increase   
 Logit Linear Log-Linear Almost Ideal 
Category (i) 0.166 0.178 0.543 0.490 
Category (i), (ii) or (iii) 0.122 0.115 0.512 0.467 
     
Quadratic Cost Structure 
Threshold 1: Frequency of 5% Price Increase   
 Logit Linear Log-Linear Almost Ideal 
Category (i) 0.626 0.611 0.901 0.835 
Category (i), (ii) or (iii) 0.467 0.406 0.821 0.719 
     
Threshold 2: Frequency of 10% Price Increase   
 Logit Linear Log-Linear Almost Ideal 
Category (i) 0.210 0.220 0.799 0.664 
Category (i), (ii) or (iii) 0.137 0.135 0.673 0.523 
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Generalized Leontief Cost Structure 
Threshold 1: Frequency of 5% Price Increase   
 Logit Linear Log-Linear Almost Ideal 
Category (i) 0.226 0.219 0.565 0.510 
Category (i), (ii) or (iii) 0.117 0.088 0.459 0.432 
     
Threshold 2: Frequency of 10% Price Increase   
 Logit Linear Log-Linear Almost Ideal 
Category (i) 0.107 0.100 0.532 0.448 
Category (i), (ii) or (iii) 0.045 0.025 0.429 0.391 
     
Quadratic Cost Structure 
Threshold 1: Frequency of 5% Price Increase   
 Logit Linear Log-Linear Almost Ideal 
Category (i) 0.530 0.478 0.925 0.871 
Category (i), (ii) or (iii) 0.160 0.099 0.721 0.544 
     
Threshold 2: Frequency of 10% Price Increase   
 Logit Linear Log-Linear Almost Ideal 
Category (i) 0.075 0.077 0.861 0.664 
Category (i), (ii) or (iii) 0.014 0.014 0.478 0.313 
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TABLE 6: PRICE INCREASE AND HHI CATEGORIES (EIGHT FIRMS) 
Eight Firms 
     
Generalized Leontief Cost Structure 
Threshold 1: Frequency of 5% Price Increase   
 Logit Linear Log-Linear Almost Ideal 
Category (i) 0.229 0.229 0.543 0.429 
Category (i), (ii) or (iii) 0.084 0.056 0.418 0.391 
     
Threshold 2: Frequency of 10% Price Increase   
 Logit Linear Log-Linear Almost Ideal 
Category (i) 0.057 0.057 0.486 0.371 
Category (i), (ii) or (iii) 0.020 0.006 0.390 0.357 
     
Quadratic Cost Structure 
Threshold 1: Frequency of 5% Price Increase   
 Logit Linear Log-Linear Almost Ideal 
Category (i) 0.543 0.543 0.971 0.943 
Category (i), (ii) or (iii) 0.048 0.023 0.678 0.439 
     
Threshold 2: Frequency of 10% Price Increase   
 Logit Linear Log-Linear Almost Ideal 
Category (i) 0.029 0.057 0.914 0.629 
Category (i), (ii) or (iii) 0.001 0.002 0.339 0.177 
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Generalized Leontief Cost Structure 
           
Logit Demand  Linear Demand 
           
Price 
Threshold >5% Increase >10% Increase   
Price 




























error 0.375 0.681 0.453 0.779   
Type I 
error 0.380 0.704 0.446 0.785 
 
Type II 
error 0.054 0.015 0.031 0.012   
Type II 
error 0.022 0.001 0.006 0.000 
Total 
error 0.430 0.696 0.483 0.791   
Total 
error 0.402 0.705 0.452 0.785 
           
Log-Linear Demand  Almost Ideal Demand 
           
Price 
Threshold >5% Increase >10% Increase   
Price 




























error 0.228 0.402 0.248 0.433   
Type I 
error 0.252 0.435 0.277 0.473 
 
Type II 
error 0.238 0.067 0.225 0.065   
Type II 
error 0.228 0.066 0.214 0.065 
Total 
error 0.466 0.469 0.472 0.498   
Total 
error 0.480 0.501 0.491 0.538 
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Quadratic Cost Structure (Four Firms) 
           
Logit Demand  Linear Demand            
Price 
Threshold >5% Increase 
>10% 
Increase   
Price 






























error 0.203 0.473 0.429 0.766   
Type I 
error 0.211 0.527 0.423 0.767 
 
Type II 
error 0.089 0.014 0.010 0.003   
Type II 
error 0.032 0.003 0.001 0.000 
Total 
error 0.292 0.487 0.439 0.769   
Total 
error 0.244 0.530 0.425 0.768 
           
Log-Linear Demand  Almost Ideal Demand            
Price 
Threshold >5% Increase 
>10% 
Increase   
Price 






























error 0.054 0.159 0.109 0.291   
Type I 
error 0.090 0.250 0.183 0.423 
 
Type II 
error 0.273 0.033 0.183 0.020   
Type II 
error 0.207 0.023 0.116 0.012 
Total 
error 0.327 0.192 0.292 0.310   
Total 
error 0.297 0.272 0.298 0.436 
           





           
Generalized Leontief Cost Structure  
           
Logit Demand  Linear Demand 






Increase   
Price 






























error 0.106 0.650 0.122 0.703   
Type I 
error 0.107 0.672 0.123 0.717 
 
Type II 
error 0.077 0.022 0.033 0.014   
Type II 
error 0.035 0.001 0.005 0.000 
 
Total error 0.183 0.672 0.155 0.717   Total error 0.143 0.673 0.129 0.717 
           
Log-Linear Demand  Almost Ideal Demand 






Increase   
Price 






























error 0.060 0.398 0.064 0.420   
Type I 
error 0.067 0.418 0.076 0.448 
 
Type II 
error 0.401 0.140 0.381 0.138   
Type II 
error 0.386 0.138 0.361 0.135 
 
Total error 0.460 0.538 0.445 0.558   Total error 0.453 0.556 0.437 0.583 
           





Logit Demand  Linear Demand 
           
Price 
Threshold >5% Increase >10% Increase   
Price 































error 0.064 0.618 0.127 0.726   
Type I 
error 0.072 0.663 0.126 0.726 
Type II 
error 0.055 0.010 0.000 0.000   
Type II 
error 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Total 
error 0.119 0.628 0.127 0.726   
Total 
error 0.079 0.664 0.126 0.726 
           
Log-Linear Demand  Almost Ideal Demand 
           
Price 
Threshold >5% Increase >10% Increase   
Price 































error 0.010 0.206 0.019 0.384   
Type I 
error 0.018 0.336 0.046 0.506 
Type II 
error 0.457 0.053 0.250 0.015   
Type II 
error 0.304 0.024 0.146 0.007 
Total 
error 0.467 0.258 0.269 0.399   
Total 
error 0.322 0.359 0.192 0.512 
           
Quadratic Cost Structure (Six Firms) 







           
Generalized Leontief Cost Structure  
           
Logit Demand  Linear Demand 
           
Price 
Threshold >5% Increase 
>10% 
Increase   
Price 






























error 0.009 0.382 0.011 0.409   
Type I 
error 0.009 0.394 0.011 0.415 
 
Type II 
error 0.058 0.026 0.023 0.016   
Type II 
error 0.024 0.003 0.002 0.000 
Total error 0.067 0.408 0.035 0.425   Total error 0.033 0.397 0.013 0.415 
Log-Linear Demand  Almost Ideal Demand            
Price 
Threshold >5% Increase 
>10% 
Increase   
Price 






























error 0.005 0.243 0.006 0.255   
Type I 
error 0.007 0.254 0.007 0.268 
Type II 
error 0.435 0.267 0.417 0.260   
Type II 
error 0.421 0.263 0.399 0.254 
Total error 0.441 0.510 0.423 0.514   Total error 0.428 0.517 0.406 0.522 




Quadratic Cost Structure (Eight Firms) 
           
Logit Demand  Linear Demand 
           
Price 
Threshold >5% Increase >10% Increase   
Price 





























error 0.005 0.397 0.011 0.417   
Type I 
error 0.005 0.408 0.011 0.417 
 
Type II 
error 0.016 0.002 0.000 0.000   
Type II 
error 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Total 
error 0.021 0.399 0.011 0.417   
Total 
error 0.009 0.408 0.011 0.417 
           
Log-Linear Demand  Almost Ideal Demand 
           
Price 
Threshold >5% Increase >10% Increase   
Price 




























error 0.000 0.134 0.001 0.276   
Type I 
error 0.001 0.234 0.004 0.344 
 
Type II 
error 0.378 0.107 0.151 0.020   
Type II 
error 0.213 0.041 0.080 0.013 
Total 
error 0.379 0.241 0.152 0.296   
Total 
error 0.213 0.275 0.084 0.357 
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CONCLUSION 
One of the amazing things in the field of antitrust is that we are still 
figuring things out.  This emblematic trajectory of the way in which 
efficiencies in merger review has evolved reveals that there is still a lot to 
be understood and developed on the way we conduct our policies.  While 
the Rule of Reason and the need to determine net competition effects of 
mergers exists, efficiencies will be an underlying topic to many of the main 
topics of discussion, such as estimation of unilateral effects, welfare 
standards, and quantitative techniques.  Kenneth Heyer, a senior 
economist at the Department of Justice Antitrust Division, goes so far as 
to state that efficiency, not competition, is the goal of antitrust.102 
For a long time, merger analyses have relied on market concentration 
as a proxy and indicator of market power.  Although simple economic 
models and existent literature show the benefits and monotonic 
relationship between concentration and the ability to price above the 
competitive level, in the presence of merger efficiencies, the HHI and 
purely concentration-based measures may not be able to fully capture the 
full effect.  As a matter of fact, the higher the potential efficiency gains 
involved in a proposed merger, the less reliable a naïve measure of 
increased concentration will be in indicating likelihood of harm to 
consumers.  Clearly, there is a need to move to more structural-based 
models and unilateral effect estimates, as those may offer better merger 
screening, as shown in the literature. 
The future of merger efficiencies in antitrust analysis depends on 
many premises.  Whether antitrust law should be concerned and to which 
extent with allocative effects of welfare, and whether consumer welfare 
standard will continue to be the primary view.  Furthermore, all discourse 
on accounting efficiencies as an antitrust defense depends on our ability to 
advance prediction methods ex ante, to provide quantitative reliable 
estimates of efficiencies, and to increase our confidence in the likelihood 
of these efficiencies to be realized. 
 
 102. William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United 
States and European Competition Policy: Are There More Differences Than We Care to Admit?, 
Address Before the European Policy Center (Apr. 10, 2002), https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech 
/united-states-and-european-competition-policy-are-there-more-differences-we-care-admit [https:// 
perma.cc/6MZA-RLK7] (“For us, as Ken Heyer stated very nicely yesterday, ‘efficiencies are the 
goal; competition is the process.’”); see also Summers, supra note 28, at 358 (“[I]t needs to be 
remembered that the goal is efficiency, not competition. The ultimate goal is that there be efficiency.”). 
